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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GARY ROGERS, by his Guardian ad 
litem, RALPH A. ROGERS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JO ANN WAGSTAFF, PAUL L. 
WAGSTAFF and W. E. LEMMON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 7586 
The plaintiff, by his Guard~an ad litem duly ap-
pointed by order of court (R. 1), brought this action 
to recover damages resulting from an accident wherein 
the defendant J o Ann Wagstaff drove a motor vehicle 
against the plaintiff, who was then a pedestrian on a 
public highway. The plaintiff joined as a defendant 
one W. E. Lemmon, father of the defendant J o Ann 
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2 
W·agstaff, who had signed and verified before a proper 
1person ~authorized to administer an ·oath the applica-
tion f.or an operator's license for the said J o Ann Wag-
staff prior to the date of the accident. The defendant 
J o Ann Wagstaff had on a day prior to the accident 
and while under the age of eighteen years married the 
defendant Paul L. Wagstaff. 
In response to plaintiff's complaint, defendant 
W. E. Lemmon filed a motion for .summary judgment 
(R. 10). In support of the s1aid motion, the affidavit 
of W. E. Lemmon (R. 7), with a copy of the operator's 
application and notification of change of name (R. 9), 
was filed, which set forth the f.act that prior to said 
accident J o Ann Wagstaff had been placed in the 
custody of Mrs. W. E. Lemm·on by virtue of a decree 
of divorce, and further that the said J o Ann W agsta:ff 
had been married at the time of the accident. This 
defendant's affidavit concluded that, because of the 
aforesaid facts, there was no responsibility on his 
part by virtue of the provisions of 57-4-12, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943. Defendant J o Ann Wagstaff 
filed a similar affidavit (R. 5), which set forth the 
same facts. 
The motion for summary judgment was granted 
by the court (R. 14). The plaintiff thereafter filed a 
petition for intermediate appeal. The court granted 
the 1appeal by an order dated the 25th day of Sep-
tember, 1950 (R. 15). 
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STATE:JIE~T OF POINTS 
That the responsibility imposed by the statute is 
not affected by the marriage of an applicant under the 
age of eighteen years, or a change in the custody of 
an applicant by virtue of 'a decree of divorce, there-
fore, the court erred in granting a summary judgment. 
ARGU~IENT 
THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY IMPOSED BY THE 
STATUTE IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE MARRIAGE OF 
AN APPLICANT UNDER THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN YEARS, 
OR A CHANGE IN THE CUSTODY OF AN APPLICANT BY 
VIRTUE OF A DECREE OF DIVORCE, THEREFORE, THE 
COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The right of a person under the age of eighteen 
years to drive a motor vehicle upon public highways 
is subject to the conditions set forth in Title 57, 
Chapter 4, Section 12, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
The statute provides as follows : 
"57-4-12. Application of Minors- Liability of 
Person Signing Application. 
(a) The application of any persons under 
the age of eighteen years for an instruction 
permit or operator's license ~shall be signed and 
verified before a person authorized to admin-
ister oaths by the father of the ~applicant, if 
the father is living and has custody of the 
applicant, otherwise by the mother or guardian 
having custody of ,such minor, or in the event 
that a minor has no father, mother, or guard~an, 
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then an operator's license shall not be granted 
to the minor unles·s the application is signed by 
an employer of such minor or by some other 
responsible 1person who 1s willing to assume the 
obligation imposed under this act upon a person 
signing the 'application of a minor. 
(b) Any negligence or willful misconduct 
of a minor under the age of eighteen years 
when driving a motor vehicle upon a highway 
shall be imputed to the person who has signed 
the application of such minor for a permit or 
license, which person shall be jointly and sev-
erally li,able with such minor for any damages 
caused by such negligence or willful misconduct 
(except as otherwise provided in the next suC-
ceeding subsection). 
(c) In the event a minor deposits or there 
is deposited upon his behalf proof of financ~al 
responsibility in respect to the operation of a 
motor vehicle owned by him, or if not the 
owner of a motor vehicle, then with respect to 
the operation of any motor vehicle, in form and 
in amounts ~as required under the motor vehicle 
financial responsibility laws of this state, then 
the department may accept the application of 
such minor when signed by one parent or the 
guardian of such minor, and while such proof 
is m~aintained such parent or guardian shall 
not be subject to the liability imposed under 
the preceding subsection of this section. 
(d) Any person who has signed the appli-
cation of ,a minor for a license may thereafter 
file with the department a verified written re-
quest that the license of said minor so granted 
be canceled. ThereUipon the department shall 
cancel the license of said minor and the person 
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who signed the application of such minor shall 
be relieved from the liability in1posed under 
this act by reason of having signed such appli-
cation on account of any subsequent negligence 
or willful misconduct of such minor in operat-
ing a motor vehicle. 
(e) The department upon receipt of satis-
factory evidence of the death of the person or 
persons who signed the application of a minor 
for a license shall cancel such license :and shall 
not issue a new license until such time as a. 
new application, duly signed and verified, is 
made as required by this act. This provision 
·shall not apply in the event the minor has 
attained the age of eighteen years. 
(f) All operators' licenses issued to per-
sons who are under the age of eighteen year~ 
at the effective date of this act •are hereby 
canceled until they have been duly reapplied 
for as provided in this section." 
The court below, in granting the motion for stun-
mary judgment, imposed upon the term "minor", as 
used in the ~hove quoted statute, the terms of Title 
14, Chapter 1, Section 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
which ·states as follows: 
'' 14-1-1. Period of Minority. 
The period of minority extends in males 
to the age of twenty-one years and in females 
to that of eighteen years; but all minors obtain 
their majority by marriage." 
The prim·ary rule of construction of statutes is 
to ascertain and decltare the intention of the legisla-
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ture and carry such intention into effect to the fullest 
degree. See 50 Am. Jur. 200; 33 Corpus Juris 522. It 
is equally clear that while a statute is not open to 
construction as a matter of course, it is open to con-
struction where the language used in the statute is 
ambiguous or will bear two or more constructions, 
or is of such doubtful or obscure meaning that reason-
able minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its 
me,aning. 
The difficulty encountered in the interpretation 
of the statute is the alternate use by the legislature 
of the term ''person under the age of eighteen years'' 
and the word "minor". By the simple expedient of 
reading the word ''minor'' in reference to the pro-
visions of 14-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, it is 
concluded that ''minor'' must exclude married women 
under the age of eighteen years of age. This expedi-
ency fails to give effect to the legislative will in en-
acting the statute. 
In section (a) the statute is explicit that the 
application of ~any person under the age of eighteen 
years who applies for . ran operator's license must be 
signed by a person who is the parent of the appli-
cant or one who has custody of the minor. In section 
(b) the statute states that a minor under the :age 
of eighteen years when driving a motor vehicle upon 
a highway shall be imputed to the person who has 
signed the application and again in section (c) the 
statute merely used the word "minor". The reason-
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able and logical interpretation of the meaning of the 
word "minor" can only be that it w·as intended to 
be a person of eighteen years or under. If the word 
is to be defined as defendant contended, in section (c) 
the word ''minor'' could mean a male person of 
nineteen years, which is obviously not the intention 
of the statute. The same may be said for sections 
(d) and (e) where the word ''minor'' is used alone. 
In section (f) the words used by the legislature are 
"persons under the 'age of eighteen years." It should 
be noted the latter phrase was used in both the open-
ing and closing paragraphs of the statute. If a clear 
3Jld uniform interpretation is given to the word 
"minor", it obviously must mean :a person under the 
age of eighteen years. This gives force and effect 
to what is the significant purpo·se of the legislature 
in enacting the statute. The Utah Court in Taft vs. 
Glade et al., (Utah), 201 Pac. 2d 285, decided in 1948, 
stated: 
"It is our duty in intei"preting a statute to 
give effect to the legislative intent as expressed 
by the wording of the statute. If reasonably 
possible effect should be given to every part 
of a statute and if the enactment is subject to 
one or more interpretations by reason of con-
flicting provisions, then that construction which 
will harmonize and give effect to all provisions 
is preferred.'' 
It is a well recognized principle that the legisla-
ture may regulate and restrict the operation of motor 
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vehicles by certain persons where such regulation ·and 
restriction is reasonable. Authority need not oo cited 
supporting th~ validity of statutes restricting the op-
eration of motor vehicles by those persons under the 
age of eighteen years. The real gist of such statutes 
is to set out a standard of ·ability required before a 
person may operate a motor vehicle, that the public, 
in its use of the highways, may rely upon others driv-
ing motor vehicles to conform to a definite standard 
of care in their operation. The legislature makes the 
proviso, however, that if a responsible person is will-
ing to vouch financially that a person under eighteen 
has the required skill and carefulness, then it is pro-
vided that they may drive a motor vehicle on public 
roads. The foregoing proposition is amply supported 
by authorities. In Bispham vs. Mahony, (Del.), 175 
Atl. Rep. 320, the court there stated Hs follows: 
''The right to operate a motor vehicle upon 
the public highways is not an unrestricted right, 
but is a privilege exercisable within reasonable 
legislative limitations, and, subject to the Fed-
eral and State Constitutions, the Legislature, 
under the police power, may regulate and con-
trol by reasonable rules and regulations the use 
of motor vehicles upon its highways, Michigan 
Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U.S. 
570, 45 S. Ct. 191, 69 L. Ed. 445, 36 A. L. R. 
1105, and as the operation of a motor vehicle on 
congested highways requires both physical and 
mental discretion, especirally in cases of emer-
gency, experience teaches that children, generally 
speaking, do not possess these qualifications. 
Collins v. Liddle, 67 Utah 242, 247 P. 476. It 
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is within the power of the State to require that 
an applicant for an operator's license shall not 
be younger than a prescribed age. 42 C. J. 7 40, 
7 45. Generally, the prescription of the age of 
eighteen years before which 1a license to operate 
a motor vehicle may not be gl}anted is not an 
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police 
power as violative of the State or Federal Con-
stitutions which forbid the taking of private 
property without due process of law. State ex 
rei. Oleson v. Graunke, 119 Neb. 440, 229 N. W. 329. 
Granting, therefore, the right of the State 
to restrict the issuance of licenses to oper-ate 
a motor vehicle to those who have reached a 
prescribed age, it follows that the State has the 
power to license those under that age, upon 
meeting required tests as to ·ability, and to re-
quire the consent of parent, guardian or em-
ployer thereto.'' 
Other jurisdictions have a clear and definite state-
ment of the intention of the legisl·ature in statutes 
creating financial responsibility. They 'are of value 
here in that they give credit to plaintiff's theory that 
the legislature intended to protect the public and has 
adopted the age of eighteen ~as the time at which a 
person should be held to an adult standard of care. 
The California case of Easterly vs. Cook, 35 Pac. 2d 
164, states as follows : 
"We are of the opinion the statutory Irahil-
ity is imposed upon the signer of the application 
for an operator's license by a minor, independ-
ent of the general liability of a parent for the 
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torts of his minor child, on the theory that an 
automobile is ·a dangerous instrumentality, the 
operation of which may not ordinarily be safely 
intrusted to a minor child on account of 'a lack 
of judgment on his part. This liability is deemed 
to cover the operation of the machine during 
the years of indiscretion of the minor, and until 
he reaches the age of majority, regardless of 
the continued control of the conduct of the minor 
by the signer of the application, unless the license 
is canceled pursuant to subdivision (e) of section 
62 of the California Vehicle Act. The liability 
created by that section is not dependent upon the 
continued authority of the signer of the ap-
plication. It is a guarantee of compensation 
for the negligence of the child during minority.'' 
The criterion to be used, as shown by the author-
ities, is the protection of the public. The legislature in 
enacting Title 57 could not have intended that the mere 
f,act of marriage gave the right to drive an automobile. 
If such were the case, then a female married at sixteen 
could drive on the public highways without affording 
any protection to the public. The financial re,sponsibil-
ity section was added by the Laws of 1935 and became 
effective January 1, 1936 after experience taught that 
people of the age of sixteen and seventeen years did 
not exercise the required care and were not financially 
responsible. If Section 1, Chapter 1, Title 14, is read 
into the statute, the ludicrous situation of a married 
female having :a right to drive, regardless of whether 
she had attained the age of sixteen years, occurs. It 
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is manifest that this was not the intention of the legis-
lature in enacting the section of the statute. 
The courts have in many instances declared that 
the mere fact of m·arriage of one under a specific age 
does not create an adult status in ~all respects. An 
analogous situation is present in the criminal law. In 
the case of Sta.te vs. Huntsma;n, (Ut,ah), 204 Pac. 2d 
448, decided in 1949, the court held that the purpose of 
statutes establishing the age of consent is to protect 
young girls from illicit acts ·of opposite sex, and that 
a female under eighteen years of age does not by mar-
riage become capable of consenting to illicit sexual 
intercourse so :as to -bar prosecution of male participant 
in such act under carnal knowledge statute. 
If the word ''minor'' is construed to exclude a 
married woman under the age of eighteen years, the 
interpretation leads to unnecessary teehnicalities. The 
words and phrases of statutes are presumed to have 
been used according to the plain, natural and common 
usage of language, unless obviously used in a technical 
sense. See Parkinson vs. State Ba;nk of Millard Cownty 
et al., 84 Utah 278, 35 Pac. 2d 814. The common, obvious 
and important meaning of the word ''minor'' is a 
person under a prescriood age, in the instant case, a 
female person under the age of eighteen years. 
The respondent W. E. Lemmon, in his affidavit 
in support of his motion for summary judgment, urged 
the proposition that because the defendant J o Ann 
Wagstaff had, prior to the accident, been placed in 
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12 
the custody of Mrs. Lemmon, her mother, by virtue 
of a decree of divorce, he was relieved of any further 
responsibility under Title 57, Chapter 4, Section 12. 
In the California case of Sgheiza vs. Jwkober et al., 
22 Pac. 2d 19, the court refused to relieve the defendant 
therein from financial responsibility under a similar 
statute where a divorce decree had given custody to 
the father where the mother (the defendant in that 
case) had signed the application for license of a child 
under eighteen years. The import is that a change in 
the legal custody of a minor should not effect the re-
sponsibilities imposed by the statute. 
The statute itself in section (d) provides for the 
manner in which :a person, who had signed an applica-
tion, can be relieved of responsibility. Where the stat-
ute provides specifically for the manner in which a 
person may be relieved, it cannot be presumed that 
the mere fact that the applicant's legal custody has been 
changed could relieve the person from that financial 
responsibility without conforming to the terms of the 
statute. 
. T.he meaning and interpretation of the word 
"minor", as used in Title 57-4-12, means any person 
under the age of eighteen years. If such meaning is 
attached to the word, the statute is rid of inconsistency 
and ambiguity. Moreover, the interpretation gives force 
and effect to the obvious intention of the legislature, 
that being the determination of the age at which a 
rp·erson may reasonably be held to •a degree of care 
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required for the protection of the public, and where, 
because of age, that standard cannot be presumed to 
be maintained then the use of the highways is con-
ditioned upon proof of financial responsibility. 
The mere fact of marriage or change in custody does 
not supply the requirement. To the contrary, it may 
limit a person's ability to respond for damage caused 
by carelessness. The statute clearly provides for the 
method of one seeking to be relieved of such responsi-
bility- and he may not adopt another means at his own 
convenience. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the 
District Court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON, 
FRED H. EVANS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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